

DDA SUBJECT FILE COPY

70-3

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Director of Information Services  
1205 Ames

EXTENSION

NO.

OIS 86-099

DATE

4 April 1986

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1.

EO/DDA

Dick:

2.

ADDA

You might want to read this appeal letter from a former employee. He makes a lot of serious allegations/accusations.

3.

DDA

5.

1206  
Ames

6.

Attachment:  
As Stated

7.

DA:D/OIS:

8.

Distribution: w/att.

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Original & 1 - DDA  
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MEMORANDUM FOR :   
Information and Privacy Coordinator

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SUBJECT : Request for Re-Review of Case E85-0004, "CIA's Internal  
Investigation of the Bay of Pigs Operation"

REFERENCE : Letter for , 11 Feb 86 denying  
release of E85-0004 on the basis of Section 1.3(a)(4)  
of Executive Order 12356

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1. As specified in your letter to me of 11 February 1986, I am forwarding a memorandum for the CIA Information Review Committee appealing the decision to withhold E85-0004 in its entirety on the basis of the reference cited above.

2. My request is based on the following considerations:

a. That Section 1.3(a)(4) of Executive Order 12456 does not apply to the study in question and has been cited only in an attempt to protect the Agency's image.

b. That denial of release of the manuscript reflects an unwillingness to expose the actions of a very senior officer which placed the future of the Agency in jeopardy of partial, if not total, elimination.

c. That the Office of the Inspector General of CIA, either by intent or through ignorance, denied the existence of records vital to the writing of this history.

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MAR 24 2 03 PM '86

19 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR : CIA Information Review Committee

FROM :

STAT

SUBJECT : Appeal of denial of E85-0004, "CIA's Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs Operation"

BACKGROUND

1. Following the collapse of the Bay of Pigs operation (19 April 1961) two investigations were almost immediately undertaken--one by General Maxwell D. Taylor and the other by CIA Inspector General Lyman B. Kirkpatrick.

## a. The Taylor Committee Investigation

1) In a letter of 22 April 1961, President John F. Kennedy set forth the broad outline under which General Maxwell Taylor would "take a close look at all our practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity which fall short of outright war." Effectively this group focused its attention on the Bay of Pigs failure.

2) By mid-June 1961 the Taylor Committee had completed its study and by the end of the year many of its findings were common knowledge. By the late 1970's the bulk of the Taylor report had been sanitized and declassified.

3) I was the CIA principal (and defacto intelligence community principal) in this declassification exercise. I reference my role in this extended process to demonstrate that I am more than casually familiar with the need to protect "intelligence activities" and "sources and methods." In addition, during a year's transitional assignment in IPD's Classification Review Division (Jan-Dec 80) my fitness reports noted among other items that:

"His judgment was sound and demonstrated understanding of, and adherence to, the various guidelines established for our work . . .

[redacted] also reviewed a number of prepublication manuscripts by employees and former employees. His judgments on the need for protection--or lack thereof--of the contents of these were sound."

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". . . He brought to our work an extensive knowledge of the Agency's mission and functions, applied it in a very conscientious approach to the classification and review of documents."

## b. The Inspector General's Investigation

1) The 22 April 1961 entry in the diary of then Inspector General of CIA, Lyman Kirkpatrick, noted that he had recommended to Allen Dulles that the Agency should "do an inspection of the [BOF] operation."

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2) Although initiated at approximately the same time as the Taylor investigation, Kirkpatrick's review was not forwarded until late November 1961. The first copy of the report was delivered per Kirkpatrick's instructions to DCI designate John McCone rather than to Allen Dulles who had not formally retired as DCI.

3) Review of Kirkpatrick's final report makes it obvious that the IG's objective was to discredit then Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell and, by implication, DCI Dulles.

4) The DDP's response to the IG's report was prompt, but in refuting the charges made by the IG, the DDP looked only at the charges *per se* and almost totally ignored the sources upon which the IG's criticism were based.

5) Unlike information on the Taylor Committee report which began to be declassified in the late 1960's and, with CIA's participation, culminated in the 1970's with the declassification of the bulk of the report, the Agency has stonewalled on requests for, information about, or release of the Kirkpatrick investigation of the BOP. Consequently, Kirkpatrick's writings and public statements subsequent to this retirement in 1965 have come to be regarded as the most accurate account of his inspection. (Reference The Real CIA, 1968, and "Paramilitary Case Study: The Bay of Pigs," Naval War College Review, 1972.)

6) Kirkpatrick's successors in the IG's office have claimed that Kirkpatrick's instructions that all records pertinent to his investigation be destroyed were followed --leaving the only document available to be the IG's report itself. In a 1973 history of the IG's office, a member of the IG's staff specified that all of the records prepared during the investigation had been destroyed. In mid-1976, then IG Don Chamberlain and Scott Breckenridge of his staff told me that all of the papers in question had been destroyed. In a memorandum to me in mid-1981, then IG Charles Briggs repeated this story.

7) Contrary to these negative reports concerning destruction of the series of interviews which provided Kirkpatrick with the information he used in his report, I recovered most, if not all, of these "destroyed" records. In addition and of great importance, I also obtained Kirkpatrick's diaries covering the period of the investigation.

## DISCUSSION

2. The documents I recovered prove that Kirkpatrick's selection of inspectors, choice of personnel to be interviewed, and use of the information obtained were deliberately and maliciously designed to insure the termination of Richard Bissell's career in CIA. Not only was Bissell's testimony ignored or incomplete, so was the testimony of the three senior officers most directly involved in the planning and conduct of the operation--the project chief, the chief of operations, and the paramilitary chief. Kirkpatrick also attempted to

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conduct his investigation solely with reference to CIA, despite the fact that the BOP operation was an inter-agency undertaking from its inception. In fact, when he broached the subject of an Agency-only review, the senior personnel mentioned above specifically told him that this was unrealistic. To me as an historian Kirkpatrick's disregard of the data that were available was outrageous. As an intelligence officer, I find it frightening that this story has never been told.

3. Following receipt of a copy of the IG's report, the DDP prepared a response which, although almost as lengthy as the IG's, was completed in about two months in contrast to the nearly six months required for the IG's piece. The DDP conceded the validity of only a few minor points made by the IG and was most critical of the DDP's attempt to limit its discussion exclusively to CIA actions. The DDP placed heavy emphasis, and properly so, on the fact that diversions from operational plans, particularly as the invasion began, were the result of demands from State and the White House. The DDP response to the IG also criticized the emphasis the IG gave to nits and lice related to gripes from

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4. Unfortunately the new DCI, John McCone, failed to take action to resolve any of the major issues raised by the two reports. His action was to insist that the two volumes be kept together so that users would have both versions available. To the best of my knowledge, this restriction still applies.

5. Nearly 25 years after the failure at the BOP and after completion of both the Taylor report and the CIA internal reports, particularly the declassification of the Taylor report, it is difficult to conceive that there is anything in my manuscript concerning "intelligence activity" (planning, execution, failure, or investigation) that is in any way still sensitive. As the leading authority on the Bay of Pigs operation and as one whose record on "security consciousness" is a matter of record, I know that there is nothing in the manuscript which reveals new data on "sources and methods." Indicative that my request for declassification is not done with disregard for the protection of sources, methods, and activities is my belief that although both my report on the Taylor Committee and the Internal Investigation should be declassified, the first three of the five volume history on the BOP (Air Operations, Role in Foreign Relations, and Organization and Planning) will continue to require protection because they do touch on still sensitive matters.

6. I am aware that caveats on protection of activities, sources, and methods can be bent to serve the Agency's own ends, but at this date and at this time these reviews of a failed operation represent no losses in an intelligence context.

7. Denial of my request for declassification continues to protect the record of a power play which could have resulted:

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a. In an internecine imbroglio which might well have led to termination of the Agency's responsibilities for covert action, if not the destruction of the CIA itself had Kirkpatrick's report succeeded in making him the obvious replacement for Dick Bissell as DDP. Certainly the evidence presented in my manuscript demonstrates that this was Kirkpatrick's intent.

b. In the dissolution of the DDP, if not the Agency, if the incompetence charged by Kirkpatrick had been accepted as fact

8. In my research on the first four volumes of the history of the Bay of Pigs operation, I was given full access to the records I requested, including highly sensitive materials held both within and outside of the Agency. Such was not the case with respect to my requests for access to the Inspector General's records of the BOP investigation. IG's Chamberlain and Briggs and IG staff member Breckenridge told me that all of Kirkpatrick's records of the investigation had been destroyed and that his final report was all that was retained. This, of course, was the same story that had been told in a study of the IG's office prepared in 1973 by a member of that office's staff. None of the IG representatives appeared in the least concerned about the destruction of such papers. That it was relatively easy for me to recover these "destroyed" records once I began the search suggests that the IG representatives I dealt with were:

- a. Deliberately lying
- b. Acting under instructions from higher authority to continue to protect Kirkpatrick's reputation
- c. Incompetent

9. The difficulties being experienced by NASA re the Challenger provide a case in point for impartial review when an Agency has experienced a disaster. NASA's self-investigation already<sup>has</sup> revealed internal dissensions that are going to require explanations. Moreover, the Rogers Committee is exposing both differences between NASA and its contractors and also between NASA and other US agencies. In the context of the BOP operation, both Kirkpatrick's and the DDP's reviews were unsatisfactory, if not useless. As an insider, but as close to being an independent investigator as possible in the security context (I was never affiliated with either the DDP or the IG), I have prepared a manuscript which, for the first time has critically examined both the IG and DDP reports on the BOP operation. Declassification of my paper would be a valuable case study for internal use in the Agency and if it could be published, it would be of positive benefit to the Agency's credibility (even though long overdue).

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

10. That my manuscript be declassified and released to me as requested in my submission of 28 December 1984.

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11. That the Information Review Committee face up to the fact that Lyman Kirkpatrick damn near did the Agency in and be willing to have this put in the record.

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